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Recent Developments

Denicolis v. State:
Failure to Notify Defendant and Counsel of Jury Note Requesting Clarification of
Definition of Solicitation is a Violation of Maryland Rule 4-326(c)
By: VictoriaZ. Sulerzyski

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held a failure to
notify defendant and counsel ofa jury
note requesting clarification of the
definition of solicitation is a violation
of Maryland Rule 4-326(c).
Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646, 837
A.2d 944 (2003). In so holding, the
court emphasized the Maryland Rules
require communication between a jury
and ajudge shall be communicated
to a defendant and his or her counsel.

Id.
In 2000, Christopher A.
Denicolis (Denicolis) and two codefendants were awaiting trial for
several armed robberies. Judge Dana
Levitz of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County sentenced the codefendants to twenty years in prison.
After the co-defendants were
sentenced, Denicolis approached his
cellrnate, Kenneth Moroz (Moroz),
and solicited the murder of Judge
Levitz and prosecutor Mickey
Norman. Moroz agreed to commit
the murders and a price was
negotiated. Later, seeking relief for
himself, Moroz told police that
Denicolis had solicited him to murder
the judge and prosecutor. Moroz
obtained a recording of their
discussions regarding the details ofthe
murders, wherein Denicolis stated he
was not completely set on killing Mr.
Norman, but Judge Levitz remained
his primary target. Denicolis was

charged by criminal information with
two counts of solicitation to commit
murder. Neither count identified an
intended victim.
Denicolis filed an Omnibus
Motion pursuant to Maryland Rule 4252 arguing the charges be dismissed
because ofdefects in the institution of
the prosecution and in the charging
documents. However, the motion was
silent as to the specific defects. The
motion was denied and the trial began.
The court, in its preliminaryjury
instructions, stated the State alleged
the petitioner solicited an individual to
murder Judge Dana M. Levitz on or
aboutJanuary 11,2001, while he was
incarcerated. The judge said nothing
about solicitation for Mickey
Norman's murder or the allegations
ofCount I ofthe indictment. Similarly,
in opening statements, the prosecutor
stated Denicolis was only being
charged with solicitation to murder
Judge Levitz and was silent on the
alleged solicitation to murder Mickey
Norman. Not until the judge
instructed the jury at the end of the
evidence stage was the alleged
solicitation to murder Mickey
Norman mentioned. No objection
was made on the record by the
defense, and no exceptions were
made.
The jury passed four notes to the
judge. The note in question concerned
a clarification of solicitation. The note

was in the record, but the record
was silent as to whether the court
responded to the note. There was
no date-stamp on the exhibit.
Counsel was unaware of the note
until after the verdict and sentencing,
when appellate counsel discovered it
in the record.
On appeal, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland held the
record was silent with respect to the
jury note and Denicolis had failed to
establish that error was committed.
The Court ofAppeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to determine
whether the court erred in failing to
notify Denicolis and counsel of the
jury note.
The court began its discussion
by stating the requirements of
MarylandRule4-326(c). Thisrule
"requires a trial court to notify the
defendant and the State's Attorney
ofthe receipt of any communication
from the jury pertaining to the action
before responding to the communication." Id. at 656,837 A.2d at 950.
Further, the rule specifies, "all such
communications between the court
and jury shall be on the record in open
court or shall be in writing and filed
in the action." Id. The rule partially
preserves a defendant's constitutional
and common-law right to be present
at every critical stage oftrial. Id.
Maryland law requires a
criminal defendant to be present
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during communications between the
jury and judge. Id. The court referred
to Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 3637, 139 A.2d 209, 214 (1958),
where it held a defendant has the
right to be present "when there shall
be any communication whatsoever
between the court and the jury[,]
unless the record affinnatively shows
that such communications were not
prejudicial or had no tendency to
influence the verdict ofthe jury." Id.
Appellants have a responsibility
to provide a sufficient factual record
for the appellate court to determine
whether clear error occurred. Id. at
657, 837 A.2d at 951. However,
Denicolis was incapable ofproducing
such a record because the record was
silent as to the jury note. Id.
Appellant and his counsel were not
informed about the jury note until after
the verdict was rendered and sentence
imposed. Id. at 657-58, 837 A.2dat
951. Even though the record was
silent on whether the trial judge
responded to the jury note without
consultation, the court determined the
record was sufficient enough to
determine an error had occurred. Id.
at 658,837 A.2d at 951.
The court further reasoned once
error is established, it becomes the
State's burden to show, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that it was a
harmless error. Id. at 658-59, 837
A.2d at 952. Here, the State failed
to meet its burden. Id. The court
referred to its holding in Taylor v.
State, 352 Md. 338, 351, 722 A.2d
65, 71 (1998), in which it stated
"even an ambiguous record cannot
support a harmless error argument,
and if an ambiguous record is
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insufficient, so, surely, is a silent
record." Id. at 659,837 A.2d at 952.
Accordingly, the court reversed and
remanded. Id.
Denicolis raised a second issue
on appeal. Id. at 649,837 A.2d at
947. The court concluded the issue
was not properly preserved, but did
address the issue of whether the trial
court erred when the criminal
information failed to meet the
constitutional requirement of informing the defendant of charges against
him as guidance to the trial court on
remand. Id. at 655,837 A.2d at 950.
The complaint did not specify by
name the targets of the solicited
murders. Id. at 659, 837 A.2d at
952. Appellant argued there was
confusion since the two intended
victims were not specifically named
in the indictment, and Maryland Rule
4-202(a) requires the complaint
specifically and concisely name
potential solicitation victims. Id. The
court stated the rule does not require
a victim to be specifically named and
discussed the rule's legislative intent.
Id. at 662, 837 A.2d at 953-54.
The holding in DenicoliS v, State
makes it clear that a failure to notify a
defendant and counsel of ajury note
is a violation ofthe Maryland Rules.
Furthermore, the court emphasized
Maryland Rule 4- 326(c) requires any
communication between ajury and a
judge shall be communicated to
defendant, his or her counsel, and the
State's Attorney prior to responding
to a jury's question. The court of
appeals also provided guidance to
criminal law practitioners that
Maryland Rule 4-202(a) does not
require a victim to be specifically

named in an indictment for solicitation
to commit murder.

